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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 For two decades there has been considerable debate in economics about the use and 
validity  of  experimental  approaches  in  the  development  and  design  of  public  policy.
1    In 
criminology, there has been a marked increase in the use of randomized experiments signaling a 
widespread  acceptance  of  experiments  as  an  effective  means  of  determining  policy  relevant 
parameters.  Recently, a new set of papers in economics by Deaton (2009), and Imbens (2009), 
in  addition  to  ongoing  work  by  Heckman  and  coauthors  (e.g.  Heckman  and  Urzua,  2009; 
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006), have revived the debate on the usefulness of experiments 
in estimating parameters of economic and policy importance in both first world and developing 
world contexts.  The debate partitions empirical research into two broad categories: design-based 
studies (DBS) which focus on the empirical evaluation design and theory-based studies (TBS) 
which focus on the underlying theory and fit new or existing estimates explicitly within that 
framework.  Included in DBS are both experimental evaluations, such as randomized controlled 
trials (RCT) and field experiments, and non-experimental evaluations focused on establishing 
causal  relationships,  such  as  difference-in-difference  estimators,  matching  methods,  and 
instrumental variables.  Much of the TBS literature uses “structural estimation” in which the 
parameters of an explicit theoretical model are identified by imposing restrictions across various 
parameters in a generalized method of moments or maximum likelihood framework.  This set of 
studies can also include models of sample selections and usually require explicit assumptions on 
optimality, rational expectations/behavior, and parametric or functional form. In the context of 
crime  research,  most  empirical  research  has  fallen  into  the  DBS  category;  the  emphasis  on 
experimental  evidence  combined  with  the  importance  of  establishing  causation  makes  this 
methodological debate critical in directing future of crime policy research.  This study considers 
the conflict between DBS and TBS in the context of an important social experiment: arrest laws 
for spousal abuse.  
The most prominent and arguably influential theory among crime scholarship is that of 
deterrence, which predicts that an increase in the cost of a crime will reduce participation in that 
crime.  While there existed some simple theoretical models (e.g. Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1972) 
and some limited calibrated models (Flinn, 1986), there was limited evidence on the efficacy 
                                                 
1 Meyers (1992) provides useful overview on this debate.  For additional details see for example Ashenfelter and 
Card (1985), Lalonde (1995), Heckman and Robb (1985), Friedlander and Robins (1995).   3
deterrence.  To determine if any such significant deterrence effect existed, a prominent set of 
experiments  funded  by  the  National  Institute  of  Justice  tested  the  effect  of  increasing  the 
probability  of  arrest  on  future  incidences  of  spousal  abuse  (thus  called  the  Spousal  Assault 
Replication Program or SARP).  The initial experiment, run in 1981 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
suggested that arrests were effective at deterring future violence, reducing future violence by 
more than 50 percent.
2 These results were used to justify laws requiring the warrantless arrests of 
individuals  police  believe  to  be  responsible  for  misdemeanor  assault  of  an  intimate  partner.  
Recent quasi-experimental evidence using FBI homicide data (Iyengar, 2009) finds that laws 
aimed  at  increasing  arrests  for  spousal  abuse  appear  to  have  increased  intimate  partner 
homicides.  The  apparent  contradiction  between  the  experimental  and  the  non-experimental 
results  can  be  understood  by  placing  the  experimental  results  in  the  broader  context  of  a 
behavioral  model of spousal abuse.  The distinction this simple model highlights is that the 
deterrence effect is a product of both the probability of arrest conditional on reporting and the 
probability of reporting conditional on assault.  By measuring only one of these parameters, the 
experiment could not accurately extrapolate to the unconditional effect of increased penalty (i.e. 
increased probability of arrest) on future violent incidents. 
These  experiments  and  the  subsequent  non-experimental  evidence  provide  a  stark 
example of a common situation where experimental evidence was necessary but not sufficient. It 
naturally  begs  the  question:  why  do  experiments  occupy  such  an  important  place  in  policy 
debates when they are likely to be insufficient to answer the policy question? While there are a 
range of detailed and nuanced arguments on the relative efficacy of either experimental/DBS and 
TBS, the crux of the issue lies in the trade-off between internal and external validity.
3  The 
benefit of DBS is that they focus on identifying a parameter with great internal validity. This 
means that in experimental, quasi-experimental, or instrumental variable settings, we may obtain 
an unbiased estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) with minimal assumptions 
that are easier to test and to believe.  The cost of this approach is that the parameter we estimate 
may not be parameter of interest. This is because we obtain the LATE rather than the average 
                                                 
2 Subsequent replication produced what appeared to be a range of results from deterrence to escalation. However, a 
recent reanalysis of the six experiments suggests at in all cases, arrest reduced the probability of future violence.  
This will be discussed in detail in section 2. 
3 Following the definition in Burtless (1995), I define an “internally valid” estimate as an unbiased measure of a 
given treatment effect in the chosen sample.  An “externally valid” estimate is a treatment-effect estimate that can be 
validly extended beyond the chosen sample to some other external group.  .    4
treatment effect (ATE).  As its name suggests the LATE is locally unbiased (or in the case of 
instrumental  variables,  consistent)  for  the  group  over  whom  the  estimate  is  constructed.
4  
Instrumental variables (IV) typically obtain the LATE because the estimation uses variation from 
only portion of the sample—in the language of IV the compliant subpopulation (Angrist and 
Imbens, 1995).  Experimental studies will only obtain ATE if the sample under investigation is 
representative of the general population (or at least the population for whom the experimental 
results will be generalized).
5  Since most social experiments also rely on a voluntary subject 
population, by the same logic as IV, experiments with selected samples will tend to identify only 
the LATE, in this case local to the voluntary sample, rather than the average treatment effect (as 
in the case of a randomly selected sample).
6  
TBS on the other hand offer a detailed underlying framework for both analyzing and 
interpreting results.  This allows studies to take observational and even experimentally obtained 
parameters and formally extrapolate the results to a wide range of settings.  These studies also 
make explicit both the underlying behavioral mechanism which the policy or program effects 
and the assumptions necessary to apply the estimates to other settings.  In this sense, the TBS 
design is built on the importance of external validity.  The cost of such a method, however, is 
lack of transparency and credibility due to the often complex and detailed assumptions required 
for estimation.  As such, these methods may lack the internal validity necessary to make policy 
makers and even other non-specialists confident in the estimates obtained. 
Thus  the  tradeoff,  agreed  upon  by  all  sides,  is  as  follows:  When  done  properly, 
randomized  experiments  can  precisely  isolate  the  effect  of  a  specific  intervention—that  is 
experiments  can  estimate  and  statistically  bound  a  targeted  behavioral  parameter.   
                                                 
4 As Deaton (p. 10) suggests “this goes beyond…looking [at] an object where the light is strong enough to see; 
rather we have control over the light but choose to let it fall where it may”.  Of course, this is a bit extreme because 
the experimental parameters are not entirely separate from the desired parameter. As Imbens (p. 6) notes “even if 
simple average effects of these interventions are not directly answering questions about plausible economic policies, 
they are often closely related to the effects of such policies and therefore viewed as quantities of interest.” 
5 This point ignores non-compliance among the subject population after the start of the experiment.  In the case of 
experimental non-compliance, two approaches are used. One uses the original assignment and compares the 
assigned treatment and assigned control groups, regardless of actual treatment status.  This estimate is the intent-to-
treat (ITT) estimate and may also be obtained in some quasi-experimental settings.  The second approach is to use 
the assigned treatment as an instrument for actual treatment status.  In this case, the experiment reverts to the IV 
case. 
6 This is related to the point made by Heckman (1992) regarding experiments under the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA).  Experiments may not obtain the average treatment effect, even when properly administered, due to sample 
contamination—that is the sample chose is not the general population which would experience the treatment in the 
absence of the program.    5
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  parameter  estimated  is  of  particular  interest  or 
relevant for a related policy.  On the other hand, while structural estimates (and generally TBS) 
provide a framework for extrapolating results, the estimates obtained from these methods often 
lack internal validity and credibility. 
Thus, the use of the spousal abuse arrest experimental results to justify policies which 
had  perverse  effects  illustrates  both  the  danger  of  treating  the  LATE  as  the  ATE  and  the 
importance of having clear, credible information available to policy makers during the policy 
design.  It is for this reason that this paper rejects the dichotomy between internally-valid DBS 
and externally valid TBS as a  false one.  At the heart of the issue is a serious information 
problem regarding most behavioral outcomes related to desired policies.  Thus we require several 
components: a credible measure the average effect of each behavioral parameter of interest;
7 an 
estimate of the relative magnitude of these multiple parameters; and the relationship between the 
distribution of treatment effects and relevant population characteristics.  When considering the 
policy decision problem as a whole, we can see the issue is not the hierarchy of evidence based 
on methodological selection (although surely the quality of any particular study is important) but 
rather how to aggregate information from multiple sources.
8  Based on this insight, this study 
offers  two  contributions  to  the  literature  on  the  relative  value  of  experimental,  quasi-
experimental, and structural estimates. 
First, this article wishes to diverge with the general tendency on both sides to dismiss 
quasi-experimental methods as both atheoretical (relative to structural estimates) and potentially 
biased (relative to experimental estimates).  Indeed all sides in the methodological debate seem 
to agree that “quasi-experimental” approaches are “second-best” alternatives to either extreme of 
structural estimation or experimental evaluations (e.g. Imbens, 2009, p.15; Deaton, 2009, p. 23).  
Actually,  quasi-experimental  studies  play  a  critical  role  in  bridging  the  gap  between 
experimental  and  structural  models;  they  provide  the  best  possible  means  of  measuring  the 
relative magnitude of competing behavioral parameters conditional on a set of both observable 
and  unobservable  characteristics  typically  based  on  an  underlying  theory  of  economic  or 
                                                 
7 Note that in general an experimental “treatment effect” need not be the composite response parameter anticipated 
in a policy (we shall return to this point later) 
8 A procedure suggested to aggregate experimental, quasi-experimental and structural evidence is presented in 
section 6 of Imbens (2009).  Imbens suggests that one may use experimental evidence to “pin down some 
combination of the structural parameters.” It is this spirit that this article suggests combining experimental and 
quasi-experimental evidence   6
individual behavior.  As always, there is a tradeoff and in particular, such evaluations require 
additional  assumptions  (as  noted  in  Imbens,  p.  15).  However,  one  might  argue  that  these 
evaluations provide the only feasible means to test the full effects of a policy and thus, provide 
greater, rather than less, external validity than randomized experiments.  At the same time, the 
more  simple,  intuitive  assumptions  made  by  quasi-experimental  methods  provide  a  more 
transparent  and  credible  estimates.    Thus  quasi-experimental  findings  can  more  useful  for 
informing  policy decisions  than comparable  structural  model  based estimates.   This point  is 
especially salient when applied to crime policy research where state-level variation in laws and 
procedures facilitates a wide range of DBS approaches.  Crime researchers especially should 
ignore the value of quasi-experimental studies even in the presence of a wide range of potential 
experimental approaches. 
Second, this article attempts to reconcile the two apparently oppositional methodological 
positions: DBS and TBS.  If the goal is gathering sufficient and accurate information to inform 
policy decisions then there is a great deal of room for agreement between the two camps.  As 
Imbens notes (p. 3) “conditional on the question of interest being one for which randomized 
experiment is feasible,  randomized experiments are superior to all other designs in terms of 
statistical reliability.”  This statement is almost indisputable but that is largely because of the 
initial conditioning statement. At issue is that in many cases the policy option cannot be perfectly 
replicated  in  an  experiment.    Rather  the  experiment  must  be  used  to  isolate  some  relevant 
behavioral parameter which we must than use to extrapolate.  It is in this sense that as Deaton 
notes (p. 4) a “randomized controlled trial has no special priority.”  Indeed, one may agree that 
RCT  is  the  “gold  standard”  for  obtaining  internally  valid  estimate  of  some  behavioral 
parameters, while noting that in general the experimental results themselves will be insufficient 
to answer the question of interest.  As such no matter how internally valid the estimate may be it 
is of little value to the policy question under debate.  RCT specifically and DBS more generally 
must be subject to the same external validity scrutiny as their TBS counterparts.  This study 
illustrates that it is not always the case that “better LATE than nothing” if the LATE estimate 
provide misleading information to policy makers.  In the end, these estimates are not useful and 
may even be counterproductive if assumptions regarding the applicability of the results are not 
made explicit and appropriate caution is not taken in interpreting and presenting these results.   7
In order to more precisely discuss these points, this article will present and discuss both 
the experimental and the non-experimental evidence on spousal arrests.  Section 2 discusses the 
experimental evaluations of arrest policy as an illustration for both the uses and limitations of 
experimental methods.  Section 3 discusses the theoretical complexity in translating the spousal 
assault arrest experiment to an arrest policy.  Section 4 discusses the use of quasi-experimental 
methods  to  resolve  theoretical  ambiguities  and  to  contextualize  evidence  obtained 
experimentally.  Section  5  returns  to  the  broader  debate,  discusses  issues  the  results  from 
previous sections, and concludes.   
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS OF ARRESTS FOR SPOUSAL ABUSE  
  The use of arrests for spousal abuse, and in particular the laws which mandated arrests, 
were  premised  on  the  results  of  a  series  of  randomized  experiments  conducted  by  National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ). The experiments were carried out over a ten-year period, from 1981-
1991, in six different cities with different police departments.  The initial and most influential of 
these studies was the Minnesota Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE).
9 The experiment was 
motivated by basic deterrence theory (suggesting that the increased penalty for a crime reduces 
the incidence of that crime), which was tested using an innovative design.  This experiment, 
funded  by  the  Minnesota  Police  Department,  the  Police  Foundation,  and  the  Department  of 
Justice, was run by randomly assigning a police response to domestic violence calls (Sherman, 
1980).  The objective was to determine if arrests were more effective at reducing future violence.  
Police  applied  one  of  three  possible  treatments:  (1)  advising  and  counseling  the  couple,  (2) 
separating the individuals, or (3) arresting the suspect.  Researchers then interviewed the victims 
shortly after police involvement and then followed up every two weeks for six months.  The 
original results found that arresting the suspect resulted in substantially less future violence than 
did either advising or counseling (Sherman, 1992). Indeed the initially estimated effect sizes 
suggested that future violence was reduced by nearly 50 percent.
10 
 The experiment, while excellently designed and extremely well done, it suffered from a 
standard experimental problem: compliance.  As noted in Angrist (2006), officers deviated from 
                                                 
9 Evidence that MDVE was discussed when passing these laws can be found in Wanless (1992). 
10  An in depth evaluation of the results by Tauchen and Witte (1995) found that arrest resulted in significantly more 
deterrence than either advising or separating the couple, consistent with the original findings of the experiment.  
However, unlike the original findings, Tauchen and Witte use a dynamic setting which found that most of the 
deterrent effect of arrest occurs within two weeks of the initial arrest.  .   8
their  randomly  assigned  responses  for  largely  one  of  three  reasons:  first,  officers  may  have 
determined that it was inappropriate to advise or separate the couple because doing so may put 
the victim at risk. This was most often the case when the suspect attempted to assault the officer 
and when both parties were injured. Second, victims sometimes persistently demanded an arrest. 
Third, officers occasionally forgot to bring their report  forms.   When  police were randomly 
assigned to arrest a suspect, they did so 98.9 percent of the time, when they were assigned to 
separate, they did so 77.8 percent of the time, and when they were assigned to counsel, they did 
so  72.8  percent  of  the  time  (Sherman  and  Berk,  1984).    When  estimating  using  treatment 
assigned as an instrument (rather than estimating the intent-to-treat effect), the effect size appears 
even larger.  Put differently, among complier, the effect of arrest is nearly 80 percent reduction 
in recidivism.  The direction of the bias gives us a great deal of information about non-compliers.  
Those who were arrested when assigned to a less severe police response were likely also subject 
to the “treatment” and may have reduce their violence dramatically. This dilutes the effect of the 
treatment group in the intent-to-treat measure resulting in larger IV estimates. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The MDVE was replicated by 5 other experiments over the next decade in Charlotte, NC, 
Colorado Spring, CO, Metro-Dade County, FL, Milwaukee, MN, and Omaha, NE.  These 
replications were not exactly the same as the original experiment in two dimensions. First the 
precise treatments differed, though all assigned at least one “arrest” and one “non-arrest” police 
response.   Table 1 reports the results from the randomized experiments.  The most commonly 
held view is that the replications failed to show that arrest deterred and indeed provided some 
evidence of escalation.  This does not appear to be the case in a simple comparison of means in 
which the only significant effects (Miami Dade survey, Omaha Police Reports and the original 
MDVE results) indicate that the arrest disposition reduced recidivism relative to any other 
alternative disposition.
11 An analysis of the pooled data from all 6 sites by Maxwell, Garner and 
Fagan (2001) finds that “arresting batterers was consistently related to reduced subsequent 
aggression against female intimate partners.” While not all the effect sizes were statistically 
                                                 
11 For an detailed and thoughtful review of how why these differences cannot well be interpreted given the data 
available, see Garner, Fagan, and Maxwell (1995)   9
significant, there did not appear to be any association between arresting the offender and 
escalation of violence against the victim.    
  Before turning to the limitations of these experiments, it is worth explicitly considering 
the value such estimates provide.  First, prior to the results from the MDVE, there was a 
tendency for police to offer non-punitive and “therapeutic” responses to spousal abuse.  The 
MDVE provided clear and convincing evidence that such approaches were substantially less 
effective at reducing violence than if the abuser had been subjected to an arrest.  The authors of 
the initial MDVE report were even able to separate the deterrence effect from a simple 
incapacitation effect.  Since more than 40 percent of offenders released within 1 day and over 85 
percent were released within one week there was very little incapacitation due to arrest and 
imprisonment.  This finding was among the first clear tests of deterrence theory and the 
behavioral parameter identified in this setting is of significant academic and policy import.   
Second, although less frequently discussed, the data from these studies also provided detailed 
information as to the importance of police response relative to other offender characteristics 
(such as prior criminal history, race, age, or employment status).  Table 2 shows the set of 
covariates available in all 6 experiments, illustrating the rich individual level data obtained on a 
sample of calls to the police for domestic violence.   It appears that the effect size from arrests is 
quite modest when compared to the effect of other factors, such as age or prior criminal record.  
This type of analysis helps contextualize the results from the experiment and provides some hints 
as to why it may be difficult to extrapolate from the data.  Third, there appears to be some 
variation in the intensity of the treatment effect by demographic characteristics.  While the 
average effect across the sites was statistically similar, the variation in the estimated effect of 
arrest on recidivism varied greatly.  This was in part due to the different distribution of 
covariates in the control and treatment groups. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
While the experimental evidence on arrests advanced our understanding of how batterers 
respond to arrest, there are several issues which make it difficult to generalize from even these   10
well conducted experiments.
12  First is the issue of sample contamination; this is the concern that 
the sample of individuals who are in the experiment are not the same as those who would be in 
place if a policy which increased the likelihood of arrest were implemented.  In part this is due to 
some of the sample restrictions from the experiments which excluded serious cases (i.e felonies) 
as determined by the officer.  In addition, officers may not of included cases they deemed to not 
be misdemeanor assault.  The unknown true distribution of intimate partner abuse case severity 
and case type makes it difficult to sign the bias on this type of sample selection.  In part the 
sample is by construction different from the policy sample.   The experimental designed ensured 
the initial reporting of an offense because the sample frame is based on domestic violence cases 
which request police presence.  This means that all experimental results are the effect of arrest 
conditional on reporting and this condition is quite meaningful in the case of domestic violence. 
The sample could not measure whether victims would be more or less likely to report to the 
police because it was based on an initial report.   
Second is the issue of police cooperation.  The departments chosen to conduct the 
experiments tended be those for whom compliance would be a minimal issue (Maxwell, Garner, 
and Fagan, 2001).  In addition, among the officers conducting experiment, most of the sample 
was collected by only a few officers.
13  This lends itself to ensuring high quality experimental 
design but not necessarily generalizability. In particular the ways in which police may choose to 
avoid compliance must be explicitly considered when determining how to implement a policy to 
achieve the experimental results.   
Finally, because of the relatively small number of cases, experiments will in general not 
identify the most serious, low-probability events.  Serious injury and death are relatively rare 
occurrences but so undesirable that policies wish to avoid any increases in these high cost 
outcomes.
14  Experimental results will in general lack the power to detect these low-probability 
events and even structural models may not be able to determine the realistic probability of such 
occurrences.
15   
                                                 
12 The subsequent discussion should not be read as a criticism of the methodology of these experiments. Indeed the 
initial MDVE and the five replications are among the most carefully run experiments in the crime literature.  
13 For example, in the MDVE, 9 percent of the officers produced 28 percent of the cases. (Sherman and Berk, 1984) 
14 This statement should not suggest to the reader that intimate partner homicide is at acceptable levels. Indeed 
women are more likely to be killed by a current or former intimate partner than anyone else.  It is rather a statistical 
statement about the likelihood of observed an intimate partner homicide given the total sample size. 
15 A similar problem is discussed in the context of suicide due to anti-depression drugs by Ludwig, and Marcotte 
(2005).    11
Thus the experimental results leave open several questions.  First, given relatively similar 
average effects but differences in the variance of these effects across site, can we generalize from 
arrests in these 6 sites to the efficacy of arrest relative to non-arrest in other locations?  Second, 
if arrest, relative to other non-arrest police responses, reduces recidivism under experimental 
conditions, what is the effect of a policy which increases arrest?  While the parameters estimated 
in the experiments are informative about both of these questions, they cannot answer them 
definitively without additional assumptions.  
 
3.  ARREST LAWS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN A REPEAT INTERACTION SETTING 
 
Although the experimental evidence from the six spousal assault experiment sites did not 
directly  answer  a  policy  questions,  the  experimental  evidence  on  the  efficacy  of  arrest 
encouraged many states to pass policies that encourage or require arrest of domestic abusers.  
These policies play a prominent role in the government’s attempt to combat domestic violence.
16  
Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia have passed mandatory arrest laws.  These 
laws requires police to arrest a suspect without a warrant, if there is probable cause to suspect 
that an individual has committed some form of assault (either misdemeanor or felonious) against 
an intimate partner or family member.  An additional ten states have recommended arrest laws, 
which specify arrest as a recommended but not required when confronted with probable cause 
that an intimidate partner or familial assault has occurred.  States in both of these groups are 
reported in Table 3.  These laws were implemented as an explicit strategy to increase the fraction 
of  domestic  violence  cases  in  which  police  arrest  the  suspect.    Many  economists  may 
immediately note that this is not a direct application of the experimental results.
17  However, this 
also represents a realistic setting in which experimental evidence, when it is the only source of 
information regarding a policy, may not produce the desired outcome. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
16 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of these statutes see Iyengar (2009). For a discussion on the role of the 
experimental evidence in influencing policy see Maxwell, Garnder and Fagan (2001), p. 4-5 
17 Indeed the authors of the original study note that mandating arrests may not be appropriate because of potential 
heterogeneity in offender responses (Sherman and Berk, 1984, p.270)   12
To  illustrate  how  mandatory  arrest  laws  changed  interactions  between  abusers  and 
victims, consider how they changed the nature of interaction in the repeated setting of intimate 
partnerships.  Mandatory arrest laws increase the cost of choosing violence. This effect is largely 
the reason why mandatory arrest laws were originally advocated.  Ideally, this increase in cost 
would result in a situation where violence is never chosen.  Unfortunately it is typically difficult 
to sustain such a situation, in particular because it requires victims to report whenever there is a 
violent  incident.    Since  both  anecdotal  and  sociological  evidence  suggest  victims  dislike 
reporting, many situations arise where batters are violent but victims do not report.  Given then 
that reporting is uncertain, we cannot assume that violence is never chosen and as such we will 
observe some level of violence.   
Arrest laws also change the cost of reporting abuse to the police.  The problem with this 
is  that  because  abusers  have  more  freedom  in  adjusting  their  behavior  than do  victims,  this 
increased cost is borne almost entirely by the victims.  To illustrate this, supposed mandatory 
arrest laws increase the utility to victims from reporting, so that all other things equal, reporting 
would be more desirable after the law change.  In such a situation, an abuser could adjust the 
probability of violence if the victim does not report relative to the probability of violence if the 
victim does report.  This essentially allows abusers to adjust the probability of each outcome to 
fully account for any utility gains from reporting to the victim. Similarly suppose arrest laws 
decrease the utility to victims from reporting so that reporting is really a punishment strategy 
taken by the victim to induce better stream of behavior by the abuser in the future. In such a 
situation, an abuser can adjust the probability of violence if the victim reports such that any 
punishment strategy is unsustainable (i.e. reporting becomes too costly to make the utility gains 
from non-violence in the future worth seeking).  
Thus, the abuser can essentially be nicer to the victim if she does not report him after a 
violent incident thus encouraging her not to report after violence (i.e. reducing the probability of 
violence conditional on not reporting).  Indeed, this is often referred to by domestic violence 
advocates as the “honeymoon period” where abusers are extra attentive and loving.  In addition, 
the abuser can take retributive action after reporting (i.e. increasing the probability of violence 
after reporting).  Thus, the counter-intuitive result of arrest policies for intimate partner violence 
is that they may indeed increase intimate partner violence because batters have a greater ability   13
to determine the outcomes.  Thus, the abusers are better able to shift the burden of arrest onto the 
victims, deterring reporting rather than deterring abuse.   
To illustrate how changes in the level of homicides can be linked to the total number of 
abusive  incidents,  consider  a  model  where  with  some  small  probability,  p,  domestic  abuse 
escalates to murder.  For n intimate partner incidents, the number of homicides in a jurisdiction is 
then pn.  There are two main theories on potential responses which may result in increased 
homicides after arrest laws: reprisal (abuser response) and reporting (victim response).  I will 
consider each in turn. 
A  different  explanation  for  the  response  could  be  that  abusers  respond  to  arrest  by 
punishing victims and this increases intimate partner homicides.  Suppose p increases because 
violence becomes more severe.  This could occur if abusers are very angry when returning home 
after arrest and so more frequently commit violence against their partners.  Thus for a given n 
intimate  partner  incidents,  the  number  of  homicides  pn  increases.    Note  that  if  there  is  no 
deterrence effect, i.e. n is constant, then, once again, the effect on the law is to increase violence.  
However, if there is a decrease in incidents (n declines) then the overall effect of mandating 
arrest is ambiguous.   This response is consistent with evidence on victim fears.  As discussed 
above, fear of reprisal is the most commonly cited reason for not reporting.  To the extent that 
the fear is rational, this is consistent with the reprisal hypothesis.  Moreover, when a victim 
leaves her relationship that she is at the greatest risk from her partner.
18  If arrest allows women 
to leave, then reprisal rates may increase.  Evidence against this hypothesis comes from the 
experimental  evidence,  which  found  no  significant  increase  in  reprisal,  though  this  may  be 
because the abusers did not blame their victims for their subsequent arrest (instead blaming 
police officers).   
While the experimental results may provide evidence against the reprisal hypothesis, the 
results are silent in the context of the reporting hypothesis.  The reporting hypothesis suggests 
that victims are less willing to report an incident if their abuser will be arrested.  Suppose that the 
probability of reporting given violence decreases after the passage of mandatory arrest laws.  
Because police presence, regardless of the police response, can disrupt a violent incident and 
prevent escalation to homicide, this failure to report to the police can increase the rate of intimate 
partner homicides.  Thus, the victim’s decision not to notify the police may increase p.  This is 
                                                 
18 Ronech Bachman and Linda Salzman (2000)   14
not the overall effect of the law since the threat of arrest deters (as it did in the MDVE), then n, 
may decrease.  In this case, the effect of the law on homicides is ambiguous.  While arrest, 
conditional on reporting, deters violence, the unconditional effect of arrest on violence may be 
small or zero if victims substantially reduce their reporting.   
Domestic violence victims may decide not to report for several reasons.  First, there is a 
psychological and emotional component of intimate partner abuse that often generates victims 
who remain committed to their abuser and do not wish to send him to prison.  Thus, the victim’s 
guilt may increase her/his own costs of reporting as well as the abusers.
19   Second, if abusers are 
arrested but no further legal action is taken they may return home within a day of their arrest and 
further terrorize their victim.  In a non-experimental evaluation of mandatory arrest as a policy, 
Lyon (1999) used a logistic model to compare the likelihood of arrest under mandatory arrest 
laws versus pro-arrest laws in two cities in Michigan.  She found that once a victim calls the 
police to report an incident, she is significantly less likely to call again.  She posits this was 
likely because police intervention in the form of an arrest resulted in retribution by the abuser 
deterring future reporting.
20  Third, in many cases, arrest laws resulted in the victim also being 
arrested if there was evidence that she (or he) physically assaulted her (or his) partner.  In many 
areas, women constitute nearly 20 percent of domestic violence arrests, a far higher percentage 
than the estimated proportion of female abusers.
21  Over half of these female arrestees can be 
identified as previous victims of intimate partner violence (Martin, 1997).  Anecdotal evidence 
from some battered women advocates suggests that these “dual arrests” are the most serious 
                                                 
19 Recent research finds that many women do not perceive any benefit from mandatory arrest laws, no-drop policies 
(requiring prosecution conditional on reporting) and mandatory medical reporting and these laws may make them 
less willing to report in the future.  (See Smith, 2000) 
20 Rennison (2000) found that fear of reprisal from abuser was the most commonly cited cause for not reporting a 
domestic violence incident.  This is hotly contested claim.  Mills (1998), based on research by Sherman and Berk 
(1984), claims that arrests actually increase re-assaults.  More recent work by Maxwell, Garner and Fagan (2002) 
find that there is no significant change in the risk of assault. 
21 For example, in Phoenix, AZ, 18 percent of domestic violence arrests are women (AZCASA).   Women are 
thought to be abusers in less than 5 percent of intimate partner violence cases (Dobash, and Dobash, et al 1992).  
Though some work suggests there is a surprisingly high rate of female on male abuse (see Strauss and Geller (1980)) 
this work is problematic and, for the most part, ignores the severity and context of the violence (see Blau, 1998).  
This is particularly relevant in the case of intimate partner abuse.  For example, suppose a husband spent years 
beating his wife severely.  At the time of the survey, the husband shoved his wife and she immediately threatened 
him with a knife.  The conflict tactics scale (CTS) treats the wife’s behavior as aggressive when it is, in context, 
clearly defensive.  Moreover, the CTS fails to properly differentiate acts of violence that constitute severe abuse.   
When severity of abuse is considered, men typically have the higher rates of the most dangerous behaviors, such as 
firing a gun, repeated their violence more often, and do more physical harm.  For a greater discussion see 
DeKeserdy and Schwartz (1998).     15
problem with mandatory arrest.
22  Dual arrests have serious implications for victims who are 
immigrants and may be deported if convicted of assault.  In addition, those who have children 
face potential loss of custody during the arrest period.  This latter response can be viewed as a 
method by police to avoid complying with the intentions of the mandatory arrest laws.  This thus 
represents a second way in which implementation of policies which encourage arrests may differ 
from experimental evaluations of arrest policies.  All of these costs may result in an increased 
unwillingness to report abuse to the police. 
Thus  there  is  a  potential  that  the  results  of  a  policy  to  increase  arrest  are  the  exact 
opposite  of  those  in  the  experiment,  even  when  the  experimental  parameter  is  an  unbiased 
estimate of the deterrence effect and is externally valid to groups outside the original sample.   
This can be explained by recognizing that the experimental results estimated the effect of an 
actual arrest conditional on reporting while the estimates presented in this study estimate the 
unconditional  effect  of  the  certainty  of  arrest.    The  spousal  abuse  arrest  experiments  held 
constant the probability of reporting given violence because all cases in the experiment required 
an initial report of domestic abuse to the police.  Thus, the spousal abuse arrest experiments 
estimated the effect of a decrease in batter's utility, when they abuse and are reported, on their 
probability  of  choosing  violence  in  the  future.    Unfortunately,  if  the  victim  also  faces  an 
increased  cost  from  the increased  penalty, then  the  overall  effect  of  these  laws  on  abuse  is 
theoretically ambiguous (and empirically these laws appear to increase levels of abuse).    
Finally, it is worth noting that heterogeneity in responses is especially important in this 
case.  Even if most offenders respond to arrest by reducing future violence, the risk that some 
may respond to arrest by increasing the severity of violence (in the extreme, committing murder) 
highlights the importance of considering both the mean and the variance of the treatment effect. 
If, as in the case of domestic violence, substantial variance in response to treatment may result in 
very serious outcomes, then the local average treatment effect, as estimated by the experiment 
(which becomes local by the non-randomness of sample selection), may be insufficient for policy 
making purposes. 
 
4.  ESTIMATES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATING ARREST 
                                                 
22 This statement is based on conversations with individuals at battered women’s coalitions in NJ, AZ, NY, CA, CT 
and IL.   16
To test the effectiveness of mandatory arrest laws, I consider the effect of these laws on 
intimate partner abuse.   This requires special attention to the total number of incidents of 
domestic violence not simply the number of reported incidents because the fraction of incidents 
that are reported to the police is potentially affected by this policy.
23  If I cannot observe 
unreported incidents, changes in the number of reported incidents and change in the total number 
of incidents (both reported and unreported) are observationally equivalent.
24  In part because I 
can observe victim-offender relationship and in part because these crimes are almost perfectly 
reported, I use measure of intimate partner homicides as a way to measure intimate partner 
abuse.  Assuming that police intervention can reduce the probability of violence changes in the 
intimate partner homicide measure may provide insight into the impact of mandatory arrest laws 
on intimate partner violence.
25     
To  construct  a  dataset  of  intimate  partner  homicides,  I  use  the  FBI  Uniform  Crime 
Reports, Supplementary Homicide Reports which provide data for all homicides that took place 
in the years 1976 to 2003 in all 50 states and the District of Columbia with additional descriptive 
variables about the victim, offender, and the nature of the crime.  I define an intimate partner 
homicide to include any homicide committed against a husband, wife, common-law husband, 
common-law wife, ex-husband, or ex-wife.
26   The data are constructed at the incident level with 
about 6.5 percent of the sample (36,442 observations) being intimate partner homicides.
27  I 
constructed a count of the number of relevant homicides by aggregating the incidents of intimate 
                                                 
23The National Incident Based Reporting System which does provide identification of the victim-offender 
relationships is therefore ill-suited to the purposes of this study.  Because the NIBRS is comprised solely of reported 
incidents, analysis of this data is not useful for measuring the true incidence of domestic violence.  
24 An ideal data source for this type of analysis would be the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) with 
state level identifiers.  Although previous researchers were able to access geo-coded versions of this data (see for 
example Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2003), recent changes in the administration and management of the NCVS make 
such access no longer possible.  Some analysis using this data previous obtained suggests that mandatory arrest laws 
may reduce intimate partner violence but also reduce the number of cases which are reported in the system.  (Dugan, 
2003).  Additional information about reasons why NCVS access is no longer possible is available upon request. 
25 The linkage between misdemeanor assault prevalence and intimate partner homicide is well established.  See for 
example Gwinn and O’Dell (1993).   Moreover the underlying causes are linked see Mercy and Saltzman (1989) 
26 The specific coverage of each law is reported in the legal appendix of Iyengar (2009).  The distribution of sample 
across all groups is also described there. 
27 There is some measurement error in victim-offender relationship variable.  About 1.25% of female victims 
reported as having a relationship to their offender that would imply she’s a man and about .43% of male victims 
reported as having a relationship to their offender that would imply he’s a woman.  Together these account for about 
200 observations and less than 1 percent of the total sample.  This is due to the classification of multiple homicides.  
In multiple victim homicides the first victim-offender relationship is recorded for all of the victims.  Because the 
selection of the “first” victim tends to be arbitrary and this constitutes a very small fraction of the overall sample, 
these cases are excluded from analysis.   17
partner homicide, as defined above, in a given state for each year from 1976 until 2003.  I also 
aggregated the number of intimate partner homicides by the race of the victim and offender and 
by sex of the victim and offender.  Estimates are then scaled using census estimates for state 
population.
28 
A plot of the trend in various types of homicides before and after mandatory arrest laws, 
suggests that these laws may have had a significant impact on intimate partner abuse. Figure 1 
shows the rate of intimate partner and family homicide rates as a function of time since the arrest 
law change.   There appears to be a discrete increase of about 0.4 intimate partner homicides per 
100,000.  There is only a small decline in the number of family violence homicides.  In contrast, 
Figure 2 shows that recommended arrest laws have relatively little effect on intimate partner or 
familial homicides.   
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  Comparing intimate partner homicides in states with and without arrest laws before and 
after the passage of these laws, I estimate a linear regression of the impact of mandatory arrest 
laws on the number of intimate partner homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.  Column (1) of Table 
4 reports some coefficients from this regression.  The mandatory arrest effect variable is defined 
as 1 in states that passed mandatory arrest laws in the years after the law was passed.  Similarly, 
recommended arrest effect variable equals 1 in states that passed recommended arrest laws in the 
years after the law was passed.  The results suggest that mandatory arrest laws are responsible 
for an additional 0.8 murders per 100,000 people.  This corresponds to a 54 percent increase in 
intimate partner homicides.   
There  does  not  appear  to  be  a  significant  effect  in  recommended  arrest  law  states.  
Although the coefficient is negative, it is measured relatively imprecisely.  Estimates in columns 
(2)  and  (3) of  Table  4  include  controls for  some  other  state  characteristics  and  crime  rates.  
Because  these  laws  are  between  the  previous  discretionary  arrest  system  and  the  mandatory 
arrest, we might expect a smaller but positive effect on homicide rates.  There are several reasons 
why this might not happen:  First, if the arrest is perceived by abusers as discretionary, then they 
may not blame the victim for being arrested, reducing the reprisal rate.  Second, because officers 
                                                 
28 This scaling by population seems the appropriate deflater as arrest laws often apply to unmarried couples 
however, the subsequent analysis has been repeated with number of married couples with little qualitative effect on 
the coefficients.   18
have discretion, victims may be more willing to call the police hoping to get an intermediate 
response.  Finally, police themselves may not have changed their behavior much, opting to retain 
discretion and fill out paperwork rather than simply arresting. 
There are several potential state-year factors that may be associated with both increased 
arrests and increased domestic violence.  One important factor is the state crime rate, which may 
indicate  how  crime-prone  society  is  as  well  as  the  other  crimes  police  must  deal  with.  To 
measure the violent crime rate, I used the number of rape, robbery, and assault crime reports per 
100,000 people from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.  Column (2) of Table 4 reports these 
results.    Another  concern  might  be  state  economic  conditions  which  may  increase  domestic 
violence.  I use average annual state unemployment rate derived from the Current Population 
Survey to control for this effect.  There appears to be little effect of these limited covariates on 
the mandatory arrest law effect. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Column (3) of Table 4 includes a more rich set of covariates including state-year level 
variables  on  demographics,  economic  conditions  and  social  policies.  Because  of  racial 
differences in crime rates, I include some demographic controls (such as fraction of population 
that is black or white).  I also include share of prison population in the state that is aged under 20, 
20-35, 36-49 and 50 or older, which may be indicative of police behavior and crime enforcement 
levels in a given state.  In addition to the unemployment rate used in the previous specification, I 
include economic covariates of crime such as state-year average log personal income and male-
female employment ratio.  Finally, the state social policy controls which are related to crime 
generally include whether the state has the death penalty and the AFDC/TANF max for a family 
of  3.    I  also  included  a  control  for  when  the  state  passed  unilateral  divorce  laws  based  on 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2006).  After including these covariates, the coefficient on the effect of 
mandatory arrest laws on intimate partner homicides shrinks to about 0.76, which is slightly 
smaller but similar in magnitude to the estimates from previous specification.  
Because there was a significant secular trend in the domestic violence homicide rates, I 
estimated  several  specifications  with  trend  variables.    Column  (4)  reports  the  results  when 
including a linear trend and column (5) includes the results when including a quadratic trend.    19
The inclusion of trend controls appears to increase the coefficient, suggesting that declining rates 
of  intimate  partner  violence  were  inducing  an  underestimate  of  the  full  effect  of  the  law.  
Column (6) reports the results from including state-specific linear trends.  The coefficient is still 
larger than the estimates without a trend, consistent with the downward trend biasing the OLS 
estimates. 
To estimate the effect of the adoption of these laws over time, the specifications reported 
in column (7) include a time since law change interaction effect.   Combined with the year fixed 
effects this both controls for any differences at a given point in time (year fixed effect) as well as 
differences generated from the duration of the law (years since law change).  The main effect of 
mandatory arrest laws corresponds to the effect of mandatory arrest laws in the initial year of 
passage.    This  effect  is  about  half  the  size  of  previously  estimated  effect  and  insignificant.  
However, while the effect in the initial year is not significantly different than zero, the effect in 
the second year (the mandatory arrest law main effect plus the 1 year post-law change effect) is 
about 0.7 and is significant with a p-value of 0.02 (joint test statistics not reported in the table).  
The total law effect in later years is similarly significant (although the 2 years post-law effect is 
significant only at the 10 percent level) and there does not appear to be a significantly different 
effect  of these  laws  over  time.    The  effect  does  not appear  to  grow  significantly  over  time 
(although there does appear to be a slight lag in the effect, which is to be expected).  It is 
somewhat surprising that the effect of the law does not  grow over time.  There are several 
potential reasons why this may be the case.  First is the annual nature of the data which means 
that monthly growth over the first and second years may be missed and is aggregated into a 
single  point  estimate.    Second,  because  the  outcome  variable  is  homicides,  it  may  be  less 
sensitive to the more subtle changes over time and, thus, is a relatively blunt outcome to measure 
the temporal diffusion of behavior.  Finally, this is consistent with a reprisal story where the 
behavioral response is a one-time adoption immediately after the law change.  If that is the case, 
and most police agencies adopted the law relatively rapidly, then we would not expect to see the 
effect grow over time.
29 
                                                 
29 Thus far, little attention has been paid to the bias that unknown homicides might introduce into evidence.  
Underlying this is the assumption that it is less likely that family homicides are not likely to be unsolved as the 
offender would be a known individual (as opposed to a stranger-on-stranger crime in which the offender may be 
entirely unknown to the police).  This assumption is not entirely accurate and indeed may produce some bias in 
measuring homicide rates (see Riedel, 1999).  However, a broad range of studies (e.g. Williams and Flewelling, 
1987; Pampel and Williams, 2000) have suggested that family homicides need substantially less adjustment than   20
Because mandatory arrest laws were an important means by which domestic violence 
became  represented  and  treated  as  a  criminal  justice  issue  (as  compared  to  a  family  or 
community problem), we might be concerned that these laws will have a disparate impact on 
communities which have greater mistrust of the criminal justice system.   In particular, some 
studies have shown that African American women may be especially reluctant to report crimes to 
the police, preferring instead to handle instances within their own communities.
30  To evaluate 
the effect on different subgroups of interest, columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 5 compare the 
effect of mandatory arrest laws on intimate partner homicides committed between white couples, 
African-American couples  and Asian couples, respectively.  The point estimate for white and 
blacks are similar although blacks have a larger increase in percentage terms (based on mean 
homicides rates reported in the first row of each column, whites have a base rate of 0.81 intimate 
partner homicides per 100,000, and blacks have a rate of 0.51 per 100,000).  This provides some 
evidence that the negative effect of mandatory arrest laws is disproportionately strong in certain 
communities.   
This is certainly consistent with some of the heterogeneity in the experimental evidence.  
For example, in Milwaukee, evidence suggested that African American men were more likely to 
escalate  (rather  than  be  deterred).    In  Dade  County,  experimental  results  suggested  that 
unemployment increased the risk that the response was escalation rather than deterrence (Pate 
and Hamilton, 1992).  Given the differences in unemployment rates across subgroups, this is also 
consistent with observed differences in estimate effects. While the results appear to hold for all 
groups,  the  heterogeneity  may  be  particularly  prominent  in  the  certain  communities.    If  we 
believe that certain communities may be less willing to report to police, the reporting effect 
might be stronger in those communities.  In this case, I find some evidence of this, which may 
suggest that reporting by victims could explain the rise in homicides.  The larger (in percent 
terms) effect among Blacks and Asians provides support for the reporting effect over the reprisal 
                                                                                                                                                             
intimate partner homicides and as such this assumption may not be too harmful. For sensitivity analysis see Iyengar 
(2009) 
30 This point is highly contested.  Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey suggests that African 
American women report intimate partner violence at higher rates than do their white or Asian counterparts (see for 
example Rennison, 2001).  However, surveys and outreach workers cite general mistrust of the police, mistreatment 
of the police and concerns that reporting will send partners with criminal records back to prison as reasons why 
under-reporting may be more prevalent in African-American communities (see Hampton, Oliver, and Magarian, 
2003; Bobbit and Williams, 2006).   21
effect if aversion to the police in general makes the response of minority communities stronger 
than the response in white communities.   
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Thus far, I have given little attention to the question of fault when constructing these 
counts.  This is relevant because the intimate partner homicide count used thus far likely includes 
some homicides which are eventually (but not initially) classified as self-defense or justifiable.  
While I cannot identify “self-defense” killings from murders, homicides of males by their female 
intimate partner may more closely approximate the subset of cases for which self-defense is a 
plausible  future  classification.    Column  (5)  of  Table  5  presents  estimate  of  intimate  partner 
homicides  with  only  female  victims  killed  by  male  intimate  partners.  Column  (6)  presents 
estimates  of  intimate  partner  homicides  committed  against  male  by  their  female  intimate 
partners.  Intimate partner homicides of females increase about 50 percent, a similar percent 
increase  to  the  main,  unrestricted  estimate  (presented  in  column  1  of  Table  5).    Similarly, 
homicides of males by their female intimate partners are significantly affected by mandatory 
arrest laws—in fact, the effect is larger in percent terms.   Overall, these results are consistent 
with either a reporting or reprisal effect in response to the law change.  Indeed to the extent that 
police intervention facilitate some flight or escape by victims, murder of the abuser may be a 
substitute  for  other  improved  outside  options.    This  evidence  is  consistent  with  studies  that 
suggest that battered women who kill their husbands do so more often when they have fewer 
extra-legal opportunities.
31   
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
In  an  effort  to  verify  the  difference-in-difference  framework,  I  test  the  effect  of 
mandatory arrest laws on various sets of uncovered homicides. If the difference-in-difference 
estimates find a significant effect of mandatory arrest laws on homicides between individuals 
who should be unaffected by domestic and family violence laws, then it is likely the differences 
identified above may be unrelated to the passage of these laws.   For the purposes of these 
falsification  tests,  I  define  a  class  of  homicides  called  “other  homicides”  which  includes 
homicides  committed  against  employees,  employers,  friends,  other  known  individuals,  and 
                                                 
31 See for example O’Keefe (1997) This is also consistent with evidence that finds female perpetrated abuse is 
affected not by criminal justice options but by outside extra-legal resources (e.g. shelters) (Browne and Williams 
(1989).   22
strangers.
32  These homicides should be unaffected by mandatory arrest laws.  I estimate two 
specifications, one with only state and year fixed effects, and one with the full set of covariates 
described above.  The results from these regressions are reported in Table 6, columns (1) and (2).  
In  both  specifications,  neither  mandatory  arrest  laws  nor  recommended  arrest  laws  have  a 
significant effect on the homicide level of uncovered homicides.  To more closely approximate 
the  homicides  of  females,  I  also  estimate  these  two  specifications  on  a  count  of  “other 
homicides” which have female victims.  The results from these two regressions are reported in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 and again, there appears to be no significant effect of these laws 
on homicide rates.  Finally, I test the effect of arrest laws on intimate and familial homicides 
which  are  uncovered  by  arrest  laws.    These  include  homicides  committed  by  boyfriends, 
girlfriends, homosexual partners, and non-nuclear family relatives.  Because the SHR data is 
from  police  reports,  the  distinction  between  cohabiting  or  common  law  married  partners  is 
somewhat blurred.  While some states do treat cohabiting and common-law married partners 
differently, the question of whether mandatory arrest laws are enforced in cases of cohabiting 
intimate partner violence is unclear and to date there does not appear any systematic evidence to 
answer  the  question.
  In  the  case  of  non-cohabiting  intimate  partners,  the  law  will  only  be 
enforced if these groups are specifically covered.
 33  The results are reported in columns (5) and 
(6)  of  Table  6.    These  results  suggest  that  there  is  no  significant  effect  of  these  laws  on 
uncovered homicides and the estimated effects are significantly smaller.
34   
 
4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Experimental  evidence  from  the  Minnesota  Domestic  Violence  Experiment  and 
replication at five other sites encouraged many states seeking better responses to the problem of 
domestic violence to pass laws requiring the arrest of individuals believed to abuse their spouses. 
                                                 
32 I have excluded homicides committed by individuals of “unknown relationship.”  While it is likely that these 
homicides were not committed by immediate family members or intimate partners, it is was not possible to estimate 
the subset of these homicides that would be covered and thus all are excluded. For additional information on this 
point see the data appendix 
33 Including boyfriends and girlfriends in the intimate partner counts for states in which these groups are not 
explicitly covered does not significantly change the results.  They remain a relatively small fraction of all intimate 
partner homicides and while there does not seem to be a significant effect on this group, the results for common-law 
married, married, and formerly married couples are robust to their inclusion.  Coverage varies by state and is 
available in the legal appendix. 
34 Fisher test for equality between mandatory and recommended arrest law coefficients is rejected at the 0.02 level. 
The comparison is between specifications reported in column (6) of Table 3 and column (6) of Table 5.  For details 
on the test statistic and distribution see Fisher (1970).   23
An evaluation of these laws suggests that they have increased level of intimate partner homicide.  
This may be because abusers escalate violence after arrest as retribution for their punishment or 
because  abuse  victims  may  be  less  likely  to  contact  the  police  in  the  face  of  an  increased 
likelihood the abuser will be arrested.  While experimental evidence rejected the former theory 
(on retribution) it could not test the latter reporting theory. However, this failure to contact the 
police results in fewer interventions risking an increased probability of escalating violence. The 
differences between in the experimental and quasi-experimental results on arrests for spousal 
abuse thus raise three important issues related to the broader discussion on the value of design-
based versus theory-based studies.  
First, if the experimental conditions had been better replicated in the policy, would the 
experimental  results  have  generalized?    Put  differently,  if  holding  reporting  fixed  we  could 
increase arrest rates, would violence decrease as predicted by experimental evidence  To test this, 
I considered the effect of mandatory arrest laws on homicides committed against members of the 
immediate family.  Because mandatory arrest laws required the arrest of an abuser in a domestic 
situation, familial abuse was also covered by these laws.  However, unlike for adults, children 
typically do not report their own physical abuse to police.  Instead, abuse is usually detected by 
an outside adult (such as a teacher or a doctor).
35  In this case the probability of reporting may 
not be affected by increased penalties for the abusers.
36  Under these conditions, a law mandating 
arrests  may  more  closely  replicate  the  experimental  conditions  and  therefore  probability  of 
severe violence to children by family members.  To test this further, I restrict attention to only 
homicides of school aged children (i.e. age 6-17). It is likely that abuse of quite small children 
may rely more on the reporting by an individual within the household and thus be subject to the 
same transference of costs as direct victims of intimate partner violence.  In contrast, school age 
children are likely to see teachers, doctors, and nurses on a regular basis.  As such, heightened 
abuse  of  these  children  is  mostly  likely  to  generate  an  increased  likelihood  of  third  party 
                                                 
35 More specifically, of the nearly 2.8 million child abuse cases reported to child protective services agencies in 
2000, 56.1 percent of all reports were from law enforcement, educators, medical and mental health professionals, 
social services personnel, child care providers and other mandated reporters.  U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Child Maltreatment 2000 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2002). 
36 Actually, many professionals have legal requirements to report suspected abuse which can compensate for any 
potential costs they might incur from reporting abusers in their community.   24
reporting.
37 Comparing states with and without mandatory arrest laws before and after the laws 
change, I find a nearly 75 percent reduction in homicides of these children.
 38  These results are 
consistent with the model suggesting that once arrest laws do not rely on reporting by the abused, 
these laws appear to function as predicted, reducing harm to victim by imposing costs on abuse.  
The effect size is quite similar to the IV estimates presented for the MDVE in Angrist (2006). 
This comparison suggests that perhaps the experimental results were inapplicable, but that were 
insufficient to determine in what contexts the arrest may be an effective deterrence. 
The  second  issue  raised  by  the  difference  between  the  experimental  and  non-
experimental results highlights the concept stated succinctly by Deaton: “heterogeneity is not a 
technical problem.”  In particular, the concept of heterogeneity is intimately tied to the theory by 
which  we  extrapolate  from  experimental  evidence.    While  understanding  the  mean  effect  is 
critical, determining the variance is crucial from determining how broadly effective a policy 
might be.  In the case of arrest for spousal abuse, while intimate partner homicides may have 
increased, it is not certain that this corresponds to increased levels of intimate partner abuse.  If 
the intimate partner homicides and intimate partner abuse are negatively correlated, then arrest 
laws may decrease abuse while increasing homicides.  The theory of how arrests affect violence 
levels is thus critical in determining what to take away from both the experimental and the non-
experimental evidence.  Understanding the nature of this heterogeneity is critical for determining 
how  effective  arrest  policies  may  be.    For  example,  if  heterogeneity  implies  that  low-level 
violence is deterred but for some small set of individuals, arrests increase escalation leading to 
homicide then a policy of more stringent lethality assessment and greater non-legal resources for 
victims may be most appropriate. If on the other hand, heterogeneity implies that violence and 
homicides increase for many victims, even if they decrease for others, encouraging arrest may 
not  be  an  effective  response  to  intimate  partner  violence.    Thus,  at  the  heart  of  the  policy 
question is the extent to which the treatment population is heterogeneous, and that aspect is as 
important as accurately estimating the mean treatment effect. This argument should include the 
caveat that the reverse is true as well.  That experimental studies may be limited in their ability to 
fully characterize the distribution of treatment effects does not undermine the value of what they 
                                                 
37 This mandated reported is believed to be related to the decline in familial homicides.  For discussion of this trend 
see Durose, et al. (2005) 
38 For detailed analysis see Iyengar (2009). This specification controls for the full set of covariates included in table 
4 as well as state and year fixed effects.    25
can contribute: a credible, unbiased measure of the treatment effect—which is no small thing and 
also critical to policy decisions. 
This  leads  to  the  final  point  highlighted  by  the  experimental  and  non-experimental 
results: the important role for quasi-experimental studies.  It is clear that experimental evidence 
is both necessary and often insufficient for determining the full effect of many policies.  In the 
case of violence, low probability but high costs events like homicide are unlikely to be detected 
by small-sample experiments but critical for decision making by policy makers. A similar claim 
can be made about theory-based designs, which do not lend themselves naturally to transparency 
for policy makers. In addition, often theory alone can have ambiguous predictions of the overall 
effect of a policy.  Quasi-experimental designs, especially those with transparent designs, have 
an important role to play, not as a second-best alternative, but as an important contribution to the 
overall information about the efficacy of a policy.   
In  conclusion,  this  article  takes  some  issue  with  the  debate  which  appears  to  force 
economists to take a stance on the primacy of either internal or external validity.  In the end, such 
a distinction is not helpful because failure of either internal or external validity is problematic for 
both  academics  and  policymakers.    Instead  of  imposing  a  hierarchy  of  methods  I  propose 
viewing  the  information  provided  by  each  method  as  complementary  components  to  the 
knowledge  necessary  to  make  informed  decisions  about  policy  efficacy.    I  also  wish  to 
emphasize the point that in empirical research, humility is a virtue.  There is a sad irony that a 
mandatory arrest law intended to deter abuse actually increases intimate partner homicides which 
provides  an  important  cautionary  tale.  Suggesting  that  implementing  policies  with  only 
experimental evidence, absent theory and some confirming non-experimental studies, may be not 
only ineffective but counterproductive, hurting the very people the policy seeks to help.  Thus, 
rather than view experiments, quasi-experiments or structural estimation as procedures at odds 
with each other, this paper highlights the value that an integrated approach, which explicitly links 
randomized controlled trials, quasi-experimental studies, and structural modeling, may provide 
in more fully understand the effects of a desired policy interventions.   26
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years since arrest law change
avg. intimate partner homicides per capita
avg. family member homicides per capita
 
Notes:  Means based on author’s own calculations using Supplementary Homicide Reports 1976-2003.  Intimate 
partner  homicides  include  homicides  of  husbands,  wives,  ex-husbands,  ex-wives,  common-law  husbands  and 
common-law wives.  Mandatory arrest states are defined as states where officers have no discretion as to whether or 
not to make a warrantless arrest when an intimate partner offense is reported.   
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Notes: Means based on author’s own calculations using Supplementary Homicide Reports 1976-2003.  Intimate 
partner  homicides  include  homicides  of  husbands,  wives,  ex-husbands,  ex-wives,  common-law  husbands  and 
common-law wives.  Recommended arrest states are defined as states where officers are instructed, but not required, 
to make a warrantless arrest when an intimate partner offense is reported.   
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Table 1. Estimated Treatment Effects from 6 Experiments on Spousal Assault 
Site  N initial 
(N final) 





















1.  Arrest 
2. Advise/ Separate 













1.  Arrest + Protective order 
2. Protective Order + counseling 
3. Protective order 
4. Restore order at the scene 
6.9 
 



















1. Short Arrest 
2. Overnight Arrest 
3. Warning that next instance will 





















Notes: Differences calculated comparing arrest to non-arrest dispositions.  All reported differences report assigned 
treatment.   Estimates are calculated using reported “Recidivism” in each study.  Treatment and control effect sizes are 
not adjusted for any covariates.  Recidivism is defined as committing a new offense at least once in the 6 month period 
after treatment.  Raw effect sizes based on sample size and number of failures  
Source: Garner, Fagan and Maxwell (1995) 
┼ The Omaha experiment actually consisted of two experiments; one in which offenders were arrested if present and 
the other issued an arrest warrant if the offender was not out. These are combined here with arrest warrant treated as 
the arrest disposition. 
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Table 2.  Characteristics of Subjects from 6 Experiments on Spousal Assault 
 




County  Milwaukee  Omaha 
 
205  638  1238  906  954  296 
Panel A: Incident Assignment Data  
Assigned to Arrest (%)  29  33  26  51  68  34 
Actually arrested (%)  43  40  28  60  68  34 
  Initial Victim Interview 
Completion Rates (%)  62  64  83  65  60  79 
              Final Victim Interview 
Completion Rates (%)  49  50  70  42  78  73 
              Panel B: Suspect Characteristics 
Age (average)  32  33  31  35  31  31 
Employed (%)   40  77  87  71  47  78 
Prior arrest (%)  59  31  43  12  62  65 
Use of intoxicant (%)  61  54  59  31  29  59 
Race/Ethnicity 
               African-American (%)  23  70  30  42  75  42 
    White(%)  58  28  54  36  20  51 
    Hispanic(%)  1  0  15  22  4  5 
    Asian/Native      
   America/other (%)  18  2  1  0  1  3 
  Relationship with Victim 
    Married (%)  35  48  67  79  31  46 
   Separated or  
   Divorced (%)  3  2  5  5  1  1 
   Unmarried  (%) 
   (current or former) 
47  50  28  16  68  52 
   Son, brother,    
   roommate 
15           
 
           
Panel C:  Incident Characteristics 
Misdemeanor (%)  98  97  37  100  100  100 
Victim Injured (%)  --  84  55  92  100  73 
Notes: Differences calculated comparing arrest to non-arrest dispositions.  All reported differences report assigned 
treatment.   Categories are pooled when appropriate to facilitate comparability across studies.  Omaha sample uses only 
the Offender-Present sample.  Source: Minneapolis: Sherman and Berk (1984) and data provided by Angrist (2006), 
Charlotte, Colorado Springs, Metro-Dade County,  Omaha:  Garner, Fagan and Maxwell (2001)   35
Table 3. Mandatory Arrest Laws by State 
  State  Year Passed  Code/Statute 
Recommended 
Arrest States 
AZ  1991  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-3601(B)  
CA  1993  Cal. Penal Code §836(c)(1)  
KS  2000  Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-2401(c)(2) 
MS  1995  Miss. Code Ann. §99-3-7(3)(a)  
MO  1989  Mo. Ann. Stat. §455.085(1)  
NY  1994  N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.10(4)  
OH  1994  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2935.032(A)(1)(a)  
SC  2002  S.C. Code Ann. §16-25-70(B) 
Mandatory Arrest 
States 
AK  1996  Alaska Stat. §18.65.530(a)  
CO  1994  Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-6-803.6(1)  
CT  1987  Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b- 38b(a)  
DC  1991  D.C. Code Ann. §16-1031(a)  
IA  1990  Iowa Code §236.12(3)  
ME  1995  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, §4012(6)(D)  
NV  1989  Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §171.137(1)  
NJ  1991  N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:25-21(a)  
OR  2001  Or. Rev. Stat. §133.055(2)(a)  
RI  2000  R.I. Gen. Laws §12-29-3(c)(1)  
SD  1998  S.D. Codified Laws §23A-3-2.1  
UT  2000  Utah Code Ann. §7-36-2.2(2)(a)  
VA  2002  Va. Code Ann. §19.2-81.3(B)  
WI  1996  Wis. Stat. Ann. §968.075(2)(a)  
  WA  1999  Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §10.31.100(2) 
Source: West, 2003. Mandatory arrest states are defined as states where officers have no discretion as to 
whether to make a warrantless arrest when an intimate partner offense is reported.  Recommended arrest states 
are defined as states where officers are instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest when an 
intimate partner offense is reported.  For specific information on coverage see data appendix. 
 
 Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  All Intimate Partner Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants   
Dependant Variable Mean  1.48   
Mandatory Arrest Law Effect  0.83**  0.81**  0.76**  1.15***  1.15***  1.10***  0.47 
(=1 in MA law states after law change)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.30) 
               
Recommended Arrest Law Effect  -0.61  -0.66  -0.62  -0.31  -0.30  -0.36  -0.96* 
(=1 in RA  law states after law change)  (0.61)  (0.59)  (0.47)  (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.54) 
               
Unemployment rate  --  0.01  0.04  0.019  0.019  0.02  0.02 
    (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
               
1 year post-law change  --  --  --        0.23 
              (0.27) 
               
2 year post-law change  --  --  --        0.14 
              (0.31) 
               
3 or more years post-law change  --  --  --        0.41 
              (0.42) 
               
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Controls for other Violent Crime rates 
a  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Controls for Unemployment Rate 
b  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State-year Demographic Variables 
c  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State-year Economic and Social Controls 
d  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Linear Trend  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N 
Quadratic Trend          Y  N  N 
State-specific trend controls  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N 
Post-law interaction effects  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R-squared  0.6125  0.6127  0.6214  0.6275  0.6284  0.6252  0.6746 
Notes: All regressions include 992 observations.  The dependant variable for each column is the column title per 100,000 inhabitants.  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
state, are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients that are significant at the .05 (.01, .1) percent level are marked with ** (***, *).  Intimate partner homicides include   37
homicides of husbands, wives, ex-husbands, ex-wives, common-law husbands and common-law wives.  Mandatory arrest (MA) states are states which require an arrest 
conditional on a report of domestic violence. Recommended arrest (RA) states are states where officers are instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest when an 
intimate partner offense is reported.   
 
a. Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, 
robbery, assault, and rape.  Indexed crimes included in the nonviolent crime count are burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and drug crimes. 
b. Unemployment estimates are based on the March Current Population Survey. 
c. State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the fraction of the population that is black, white, and other race, 
as well as age composition indicating share of prison population that is aged 14-19, 20-49, 50 or older. 
d. State economic control variables are based on the March Current Population Survey and include the variables log state personal income per capita, and female-to-male 
employment ratio.  State social policy controls include max AFDC/TANF for a family of 3, unilateral divorce laws indicators (based on classification in Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2006) and indicators for whether the state has the death penalty.  Table 5. Estimates of the Effect of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws on Intimate Partner Homicides for Various Subgroups 








homicides with  
White victims  
and perpetrator 
Intimate partner 
homicides with  
Black victims  
and perpetrators 
Intimate partner 
homicides with  
Asian victims  
and perpetrators 
Homicides of  
females by  
male intimate 
partners 
Homicides of  
males by  
female intimate 
partners 
Dependant Variable Mean  1.48  0.81  0.59  0.01  0.89  0.59 
Mandatory Arrest Law Effect  1.1525***  0.5080**  0.6208***  0.0144*  0.6023**  0.5502*** 
(=1 in MA law states after law change)  (0.4067)  (0.2339)  (0.1981)  (0.0077)  (0.2459)  (0.1863) 
             
Recommended Arrest Law Effect  -0.2960  -0.1225  -0.1342  0.0118  -0.0738  -0.2222 
(=1 in RA  law states after law change)  (0.6348)  (0.2785)  (0.3435)  (0.0124)  (0.3251)  (0.3270) 
             
unemployment rate  0.0196  0.0181  0.0066  -0.0000  0.0037  0.0159 
  (0.0741)  (0.0339)  (0.0403)  (0.0005)  (0.0366)  (0.0383) 
             
Controls for other Crime Rates 
a  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Controls for Unemployment Rate 
b  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State-year Demographic Variables 
c  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State-year Economic and Social Controls 
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Linear Trend  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R-squared  0.6284  0.6733  0.5643  0.4536  0.6448  0.5910 
Notes: All regressions include 994 observations.  The dependant variable for each column is the column title per 100,000 inhabitants.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered by state, are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients that are significant at the .05 (.01, .1) percent level are marked with ** (***, *).  Intimate partner 
homicides include homicides of husbands, wives, ex-husbands, ex-wives, common-law husbands and common-law wives.  Mandatory arrest (MA) states are 
states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence. Recommended arrest (RA) states are states where officers are instructed but not 
required to make a warrantless arrest when an intimate partner offense is reported.   
a. Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are 
murder, robbery, assault, and rape.  Indexed crimes included in the nonviolent crime count are burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and drug crimes. 
b. Unemployment estimates are based on the March Current Population Survey. 
c. State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the fraction of the population that is black, white, and 
other race, as well as age composition indicating share of prison population that is aged 14-19, 20-49, 50 or older.   39
d. State economic control variables are based on the March Current Population Survey and include the variables log state personal income per capita, and female-
to-male employment ratio.  State social policy controls include max AFDC/TANF for a family of 3, unilateral divorce laws indicators (based on classification in 
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006) and indicators for whether the state has the death penalty.    40
 
 Table 6. Falsification Tests of Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  “Other Homicides” per 100,000 
inhabitants 
“Other Homicides” with female 
victims 
Intimate Partner Homicides 
Uncovered by Arrest laws  
Dependant Variable Mean  10.37  1.41  0.73 
Mandatory Arrest  4.2531  3.9985  0.5064  0.4631  0.2929  0.2656 
Law Effect  (2.7014)  (2.6749)  (0.4168)  (0.4036)  (0.2103)  (0.2071) 
             
Recommended  0.5980  0.2595  -0.2492  -0.3104  0.1237  0.0911 
Arrest Law Effect  (3.8689)  (3.8360)  (0.5675)  (0.5531)  (0.2128)  (0.2050) 
             
    -0.1151    -0.0167    -0.0153 
    (0.4438)    (0.0569)    (0.0233) 
Controls for other Crime Rates 
a  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Controls for Unemployment Rate 
b  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
State-year Demographic Variables 
c  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
State-year Economic and Social Controls 
d  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Linear Trend  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R-Squared  0.6434  0.6454  0.6011  0.6050  0.6669  0.6710 
Notes: All regressions include 994 observations.  The dependant variable for each column is the column title per 100,000 inhabitants.  Robust standard errors, clustered 
by state, are reported in parentheses.  Coefficients that are significant at the .05 (.01, .1) percent level are marked with ** (***, *).  “Other homicides” include homicides 
committed against employees, employers, other (non-immediate) family, friends, other known individuals, and strangers.  Intimate partner homicides uncovered by law 
refers to relationships that are classified as intimate partner but were not specified in the state’s arrest law statute.  See Legal Appendix for detailed coverage by state.   
Mandatory arrest (MA) states are states which require an arrest conditional on a report of domestic violence. Recommended arrest (RA) states are states where officers 
are instructed but not required to make a warrantless arrest when an intimate partner offense is reported.   
a. Crime rate controls use FBI Uniform Crime reports for the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Indexed crimes included in the violent crime variable are murder, 
robbery, assault, and rape.  Indexed crimes included in the nonviolent crime count are burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and drug crimes. 
b. Unemployment estimates are based on the March Current Population Survey. 
c. State demographic controls are based on the March Current Population Survey and include variables for the fraction of the population that is black, white, and other 
race, as well as age composition indicating share of prison population that is aged 14-19, 20-49, 50 or older. 
d. State economic control variables are based on the March Current Population Survey and include the variables log state personal income per capita, and female-to-male 
employment ratio.  State social policy controls include max AFDC/TANF for a family of 3, unilateral divorce laws indicators (based on classification in Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2006) and indicators for whether the state has the death penalty.  
  